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On June 19, 2025, a trilateral meeting was held in Kunming, China. High-level delegates from China, Bangladesh, and Pakistan attended it. Organized by China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) under the charming title of “Trilateral Economic and Regional Integration Dialogue”, this conference is being highlighted for proposing something unimaginable for New Delhi: a functional alterative to the dead SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation).
The Chinese official stated that its purpose would be to enhance infrastructural cooperation, trade liberalization, cooperation in the domain of emerging technologies, and maritime partnership (traditional as well as non-traditional). This proposal has not been finalized yet but experts, particularly Beijing based, argue that the process is soon to begin.
Here arises an interesting question: what is the need to replace an already established SAARC? The simple answer in this domain lies in the very question. As the name shows, SAARC includes South Asian states, such as Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and others. It is dysfunctional since a decade now: the last pragmatic, policy-oriented, and participatory dialogues were held in 2014. But, since the right-wing BJP led government came to power in India, there has been no progress seen in any domain ascribed the SAARC’s charter.
Instead, Modi has politicized this platform to enforce its unholy bid of converting the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) into an Indian Lake, and considers this as India’s right under its so called Akhand Bharat project – with its ancient and imperial roots. Moreover, politicizing of non-state actors, mainly terrorists, after the Uri attackhas increased the deadlock between the two nuclear neighbors, though multiple independent research reports claim this to be a false-flag operation under Ajit Doval’s doctrine.
For instance, India refused to attend Islamabad based SAARC meeting in 2016 following the attacks. After this, no progress has been witnessed to revive SAARC yet. Instead, India’s regional hegemonic ambition is the biggest hurdle in reaching any pragmatic conclusion in the second-tier meetings.
India has also pressurized small, and dependent states, i.e. Bhutan and Nepal, in South Asia to redirect their focus towards India-led BIMSTECH, IORA, and bilateral ties; ultimately bypassing SAARC. On the other hand, it has increased its strategic cooperation with the United States, Japan, and France by aligning with their self-propagated Indo-Pacific strategy. Also, it actively participates in QUAD, an anti-China alliance, and enjoys bilateral deals with the United States i.e. LEMOA.
Given this anti-China, Anti-Pakistan pro-western containment vision, China, which sees the region as Asia-Pacific, incorporating some African states as well, has shifted its attention to curb the evolving India’s regional sphere of influence. This vision of strategizing an alternative platform to replace SAARC can be seen though this broader geopolitical gambit. Not to surprise, China had been an observer state in SAARC and also proposed BRI to India as well but New Delhi chooses confrontation instead of cooperation.
For now, Pakistan and Bangladesh have informally endorsed the vision and the upcoming months will witness a progressive changes in politics of fragmented regionalism in the South Asian context. The follow-up meetings also invited Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Afghanistan and showcased the positive results, given the economic incentives China offers in contrast to India.
Moreover, another question in this regard would be the domain of the organization: whether the existing China led platforms (with minus India status) absorb the new block or it will be established as an independent forum. For instance, there exists China-Indian Ocean Regional Forum (IORF) which has 19 Asian member states, without India, and it was formed in 2022 with the excessive focus on the development of Blue economy, ports, shipping logistics, and maritime security among the members.
Similarly, China-South Asia Expo and China-South Asia Cooperation Center also exit with minus-India status. BRI corridors are also functional in the region. The purpose of mentioning these platforms is to negate the very notion that the minus-India bloc will not survive in a long-term. Instead, Beijing does not even take Washington into consideration when it comes to implementing its strategic visions. So, one can say that the existing of a new platform can be functionalized.
This event has several regional geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geostrategic implications. For instance, excluding India from Kunming talks shows the growing frustration over India’s non cooperative attitude under its Political Expansionism Nationalism (PEN). Ultimately, small states are compelled to choose whether to join China-led camp or to stay under the dependency of New Delhi. Lack of seriousness and no compromise behavior are the prominent reasons in the fragmentation of South Asia. For instance, in 2024, India failed to reach a conclusion in BIMSTECH over the free trade agreement given its tensions with Myanmar. This attitude provides a vacuum to be filled by Beijing.
Moreover, the anti-India bloc in South Asia is a nightmare for India as it is already struggling to counter China’s String of Pearls strategy, a self-claimed Indian origin conspiracy that China is encircling India via control over the regional dually used ports i.e. Hambantota and Gwadar
Importantly, if operationalized, this minus India platform will sideline the normative leadership and soft power of India. With its tech-scholarships, Confucius institutions, AI-driven governance cooperation, and increasing infrastructural connectivity projects, states may choose between New Delhi and Beijing. For instance, Maldives reversed its Digital India program stating data sovereignty concerns after pro-China president took office last year. The other such pick and drop incidents are yet to be observed.
For some states, e.g., Nepal and Bhutan, it can worsen the geopolitical competition. For instance, economic dependency on China and the normative affiliation with India will make it harder to survive under the neutral multilateral diplomacy. Apart from that, in its positive notion, the proposed platform can prevent states playing in the hands of the U.S. provided that they are forced to implement anti-China, Pro-U.S policies in order to gain economic leverage whether in bilateral deals or in multilateral platforms i.e. IMF.
Overall, one can conclude that it is a myth and uninformed conclusion by most of the so called Pakistani and Indian authors that the minus-India bloc could not survive without India. Instead, the repercussions for New Delhi are of severe nature that can be felt if one removes the RSS mask.






